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This note is concerned with state intervention in
Nigeria, where both state and local private capi-
talist enterprise are weak, hut where there exist
pressures for greater autonomy from foreign
capital and influence. It is argued that recent state
intervention has not succeeded in creating the
conditions for a productive pattern of capitalist
development. It is further suggested that promi-
nent features of the Nigerian State and public
policy are best analysed if the State is understood
to be the site of class interaction. This approach
has the advantage of relating state institutions,
policies and personnel to civil society. The logic
of state intervention can then be examined, not
simply in instrumental, universal terms like
growth, welfare and efficiency, or in terms of the
interests of a single class, but as the resolution
of certain economic and social forces.
Conceptual limitations
Before pursuing this argument, however, it is
worthwhile setting out some of the limitations
of existing economic approaches to the State.
These have been influential in determining con-
ceptions of development and the framework for
policy and research in Nigeria and elsewhere.
They are also, in a wider sense, part of the fabric
of ideas transferred from western intellectual
centres to Nigeria which would need to be con-
sidered in any detailed account of Nigeria's poli-
tical economy. The Anglo-Saxon mainstream eco-
nomics tradition which has dominated economic
thinking in Nigeria does not provide the basis
for an adequate interpretation of the role of the
State. The normative roots of this tradition are
located in a specifically European experience of
the relation between the State and civil society
and the rise of industrial capitalism. It is not
obvious that judgments about the State which
incorporate these values will lead to an under-
standing of social and economic forces in dif-
ferent historical circumstances. Simply to trans-
fer the term 'mixed economy' is to introduce a
number of assumptions about public and private
domains which can obscure the nature of the
State and the relations between foreign, private
and public enterprise. Economic analysis has
detached the State from its socio-economic con-
text and given it an historical, instrumental role
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which is often simply taken for granted. This
procedure is naturally attractive to those econo-
mists who see their discipline as nothing if not
a policy science, and it becomes irresistible where
an ideology exists which sees the State as the
main agent of development. The result is that the
logic of state intervention comes to be presented
in terms of universal ends like growth, welfare
and efficiency. Important qualitative relations
between surplus generation, investment and
growth are neglected. Conflicts of interest are
not recognised. This kind of abstraction from
reality is familiar in the planning literature where
technocratic models assume the existence of a
powerful central agency while ignoring the actual
process of planning and the economic mechan-
isms that do exist. This neglect of the State in
society not only impoverishes understanding and
prescription, it also precludes the development of
a comparative political economy.
Efforts to develop productive capitalism in
Nigeria
The Nigerian State has generally supported
foreign capital. The colonial State encouraged
and regulated the transfer of crops, capital and
labour from the peasant primary sector. On this
basis, the State supported foreign capital accumu-
lation in commerce, finance and metropolitan
industry. Nigeria's sterling balances, state rev-
enues and level of economic activity were all
tied to the fortunes of export commodities. When
monopoly or war threatened the orderly export
of produce or supply of imports, the State inter-
vened. The peasant surplus also financed the
provision of public utilities and infrastructure
which were a necessary part of the colonial
economic system. The extractive role of the
marketing boards, apart from its long-term dis-
incentive effect on agricultural output, also im-
peded Nigerian capital formation by transferring
funds to the colonial State. As Sir Percival
Griffiths wrote in 1955, "it means that the Devel-
opment Board which operates the Marketing
Board surplus funds in Nigeria is in fact the
only potential African investor . . . . the economic
pattern is thereby being set along the lines of
state socialism . . . . when ministers and officials
talk of African capital participation in new ven-
tures they almost invariably mean participation
by the Development Board. The foreign investor
thus faces a dilemma. Either he must provide all
the capital and so be vulnerable to nationalist
attack, or else he must enter into partnership
with a quasi-government corporation, and this
latter possibility will be unattractive to most
capitalists." (Griffiths, 1955). Griffiths went on to
show how control over the network of credit
enabled metropolitan capital to monopolise large-
scale commercial activity. However, fundamental
shifts of power within the State after 1952 in-
creased competition among industrial exporters,
and nationalist demands for a share in the dis-
tributive trade weakened the position of British
commercial capital.
With the approach of independence, the State
provided finance, protection and tax incentives
in the early stages of industrialisation. Considera-
tions of market strategy, various types of state
subsidy and tariff escalation due to balance of
payments difficulties in the early 1960s, all en-
couraged the expansion of foreign capital from
its commercial base into manufacture and
prompted the flow of new investment from
abroad. Although there was a withdrawal of
foreign capital from commerce during this period,
it should not be exaggerated. Foreign capital
still dominates important sections of the import
and wholesale trade where distributive mono-
polies are the norm. Thus 'import substitution,
which involved the establishment of the capitalist
mode and the internationalisation of production
and consumption was not part of a planned,
coherent strategy of industrialisation. Nigerian
business was effectively restricted to comercial
and service activities, to small-scale capitalism
and to non-capitalist formations. This pattern of
accumulation and productive relations has per-
sisted despite new initiatives by the State. The
commercial bourgeoisie plays what is essentially
an intermediary role between the consumer and
the State on the one hand, and foreign capital
and the international market on the other. Its
interests are allied to those of foreign capital.
'Nigerianisation not nationalisation' was the
theme of a political class which sought to in-
crease its wealth through commerce, urban
poverty and links with foreign capital. It dis-
pensed patronage to indigenous businessmen and
created employment for nationals by the ex-
pansion of the public service and the replace-
ment of foreign personnel. Foreign capital was
secure and it responded to this bourgeois nation-
alism by further investment and by the employ-
ment of nationals as Board members, managers
and as middlemen who had access to the state
machinery.
An important state institution in this period was
the statutory corporation in the form of market-
ing boards and regional development corpora-
tions. These state institutions were the means
whereby enlarged state revenues were mobilised
and distributed. Yet in the absence of an effec-
tive class basis the State proved incapable of
regulating and administering these institutions
and the intense regional pressures to which they
were subject. The State lacked autonomy, and
tidy distinctions between the private and public
interest had no place where politicians and
businessmen were one and the same. Both state
intervention and laissez-faire were exercises of
political power by interests which aspired to
control the State and use it for their own ends.
In the analyses of economists, the marketing
boards underwent an interesting evolution from
being instruments of price and income stabilisa-
tion to being a means of taxation, to become
finally an instrument for mobilising development
funds. By the 1960s the reality had become more
complex. As Wrigley writes, statutory marketing
boards became a "convoluted collaboration of
government, party public corporation, and private
business" (Wrigley, 1974). The regional loans
boards as documented by Schatz fared little
better (Schatz, 1970). In terms of the prevailing
development strategy these bodies were to pro-
mote economic development through loans to
indigenous private enterprise. They were not suc-
cessful in promoting a productive bourgeoisie.
The alternative strategy of directly productive
state enterprise was not considered and the evi-
dence appeared to be against it. Teriba, in his
study of the Western Nigerian Development Cor-
poration, concluded by stressing the superiority
of an industrial development strategy relying on
minority investments in private industry over
that relying on exclusive investment and manage-
ment by public development institutions (Teriba,
1966). By 1966 the pattern of investment in
manufacturing was 10 per cent private Nigerian,
20 per cent State and 70 per cent foreign.
Military rule, a more powerful bureaucracy,
oil surpluses, and the bitter experiences of civil
war, provided the context for efforts to restrict
the sphere of foreign capital and secure a more
self-reliant pattern of development than that
which characterised the First Republic. First, the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotions Decree (NEPD)
of 1972 (revised in 1977) attempted to strengthen
national capital. Second, under the 1970-74 Second
National Development Pian public corporations
proliferated, and efforts were made to extend the
operations of state enterprises into directly pro-
ductive activities. Before looking at these
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measures in more detail, it will be useful to sketch
some of the consequences of the large increase
in oil revenue which coincided with them.
Oil revenues have underlined certain structural
weaknesses in the open economy. Easy access to
consumer goods, especially durables, and inter-
mediate and capital goods has led to a commer-
cial boom and intensified international competi-
tion for the Nigerian market. In cases where it
has proved more profitable to import, this has
positively discouraged local manufacturing. The
narrow industrial base has not been diversified
much beyond light consumer goods, assembly and
processing. Engineering industry is virtually non-
existent. Domestic resources have been used in
ways which do not promote self-sufficiency. For
example, professional manpower is directed into
the highly profitable commercial and service
sectors, or into the foreign controlled sector
which leads wage and salary movements. Food
prices in urban areas rose sharply following the
monetisation of oil revenues, and the food im-
port bill rose to N440m in 1976.' The State has
responded with measures to increase food pro-
duction including the organisation of production
and marketing for root crops and grains, more
favourable producer prices, subsidised inputs,
and large-scale irrigation and mechanisation
schemes.
A further consequence of dependence on oil
revenues is the rapid turn round in the balance of
payments from a N3,lOOm surplus in 1974 to a
small deficit in 1976.
The N30,000m Third National Development
Plan was based on the assumption of surpluses
to 1980. An important element here is the large
deficit on invisisible account (N1,400m in 1976)
which reflects not only the flow of profits on
foreign investment but also important services
associated with the import trade and reliance on
foreign technology, management and consultancy
in both oil and non-oil sectors. Finally, the exis-
tence of a centralised oil surplus (oil revenues
account for about 80 per cent of current federal
revenues) has increased the share of state ex-
penditure. In 1974-75 federal government ex-
penditure accounted for 37 per cent of GDP.
This does not include statutory payments from
the centre to the states, which, following changes
in the federal revenue allocation formula, have
become a more important element in states'
revenues The State thus forms a large part of the
1 Nl = £0 83. Since the adoption of an administered exchange
rate policy in April 1974, the Naira has appreciated in terms
of sterling by 28 per cent.
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Nigerian market, and state control over the dis-
tribution of the surplus has increased.
The first phase of the Nigerian Enterprises
Promotions Decree required exclusive Nigerian
ownership of categories of retail trade, service
and small-scale enterprises, many of which were
owned by Lebanese. No significant new entre-
preneurial opportunities were opened up by this
transfer, nor was the competitiveness of this low-
technology sector with the state-protected,
foreign-controlled sector increased. More sign-
ficant from a developmental perspective was the
further requirement that enterprises with capital
in excess of N400,000 or a turnover of Nim
secure at least 40 per cent local participation.
This was achieved through public and private
issue of equity capital to managerial, bureau-
cratic, and professional strata. The measure had
the simultaneous effect of enlarging the capital
base of foreign controlled enterprises and making
the capitalist mode acceptable to groups whose
consumptionand now incomedepend directly
on it. It marked a large step in the accumulation
and concentration of wealth by the bourgeoisie.
Together with land and urban property, these
assets will set up a skewed distribution of in-
come in the future.
Under the second phase of the decree there will
be an extension of Nigerian ownership by equity
participation These schedules cover full, majority
and minority Nigerian ownership. How far do
these schedules follow the pattern of higher
technology enterprises being associated with
majority foreign ownership? This pattern is dis-
turbed on two counts. First, there is the presence
of large commercial enterprises like UAC, Holts,
PZ, SCOA and Leventis which are now required
to extend Nigerian participation from 40 to 60
per cent. These descendants of colonial mercan-
tile capital are exempt from Schedule 1 of the
decree which reserves the wholesaling of locally
manufactured goods such as textiles for
Nigerians. Second, a number of older established
industries like tobacco, textiles, and pharmaceuti-
cals remain with a majority foreign interest.
On the whole the decree has accommodated the
interests of foreign capital. It will strengthen the
transnational component of the bourgeoisie,
though effective control will not pass to this
managerial group. Given the weakness of national
capital, the State is not in a very strong position
to legislate measures to extend local ownership
or control foreign technology compared with, for
example, India or Mexico. To sustain the rather
uncertain flow of foreign investment, the gov-
ernment has given repeated assurances that the
indigenisation measures are not aimed at national-
isation.
Where the State has participated with foreign
capital in joint ventures (oil, vehicle assembly,
construction, fertilisers, cement, agro-industry),
it is less indicative of a strong productive state
capitalism than the performance of a support
role for foreign capital. Murray aptly notes that
state interests "represented in peripheral manu-
facturing capital linked with locally operating
metropolitan capital, via joint ventures for
example, take a . . . share of the surplus value
which represents a rent on nationality, political
connections and privileged access to some types
of economic information" (Murray, 1972). The
main effort of the Nigerian National Oil Cor-
poration has been successfully directed at ob-
taining a larger share of the oil revenues. Trans-
fer of technology has proceeded slowly and the
corporation has recently become involved in
drilling and exploration activity. The activities of
the corporation are thus essentially commercial
and administrative. They do not yet displace
the functions of the multinational oil firms or
their specialist foreign sub-contractors to any
significant extent. The Nigerian Mining Corpora-
tion has taken a minority interest in foreign tin
companies and plans to become directly involved.
in mining operations.
Below the federal level the corporate strength of
state institutions is variable. On the one hand,
the New Nigeria Development Company has
an extensive investment portfolio, often in part-
nership with foreign capital. At the other ex-
treme, and on a smaller scale, the Kano State
Investment Corporation under the Gowon regime
was operated like a private company by state
officials. Many of its unprofitable investments
were prompted by aliens who needed local in-
vestment to meet the requirements of the NEPD.
The corporation also acted as a commission agent
for foreign parties who were trying to buy crude
oil from Nigeria and for Nigerians who imported
cement and milk.
It is in the financial sector that state power and
economic control is most likely to be exercised in
an attempt to direct resources towards a more
productive pattern of investment. The State has
taken a majority interest in the commercial
banks and a larger role is envisaged in the ex-
pansion and consolidation of the existing state
banks (the Nigerian Industrial Development
Bank and the Nigerian Banks for Commerce and
Industry) to provide credit for industrial ventures.
Recent legislation has directed the small, newly
arrived group of merchant banks to shift their
assets from highly profitable trade-related assets
to longer-term lending. It seems unikely, how-
ever, that these moves to alter investment patterns
by changing the financial structure will be suc-
cessful without changes at the level of economic
organisation.
Commercial relations as obstacles to production
Why have the many state initiatives aimed at pro-
moting rapid development of capitalist production
not yielded better results? The underdevelopment
of manufacturing received much attention in the
1975-80 Third National Development Plan which
states that despite a high rate of GDP growth of
12 per cent between 1962 and 1972,
"the share of manufacturing and craft increased
by only 2.15 per cent rising from 5.64 per cent
of GDP in 1962 to 7.79 per cent in 1972. The
current 8 per cent share of manufacturing in
GDP compares quite unfavourably with the
15 per cent to 20 per cent share attained in
many countries at a similar stage of economic
development. A recent study of the experiences
of about 90 countries of varying sizes and
degrees of development suggests that Nigeria
today should have a manufacturing sector
representing about 16 per cent of the GDP.
While part of the difference between the actual
and expected share of the sector in the GDP
can be explained by the unusual importance
of the oil sector, the Nigerian manufacturing
sector is nevertheless underdeveloped relative
to the size and the general level of development
of the whole economy."
(Central Planning Office, 1975 147).
One widely accepted reason for the reluctance of
Nigerian entrepreneurs or foreign firms to under-
take production is the absence of adequate infras-
tructure. This similarly deters state corporations
which are established to undertake profit-orien-
tated ventures. But many infrastructural projects
are themselves types of state capitalism which in-
volve productive activity. It remains to explain
the difficulties in getting projects off the ground.
Much has been said about the shortage of man-
agerial and technical manpower. At the same
time the State has attempted to exercise control
over the employment of foreign personnel to
ensure Nigerianisation. It is difficult to disentangle
myth from reality here. Foreign companies have
little difficulty in securing the services of qualified
Nigerians, although they may not retain their
services for long in an intensely competitive
market. It should be noted however, th.at it may
be in the interest of foreign companies to pro-
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mote the idea of manpower shortage in order to
reserve key management positions for aliens and
block the effective transfer of technology. Thus
the build-up of local technological capacity can
be delayed. The result is frustration, the under-
utilisation of qualified personnel, a fragmenta-
tion of expertise, and continued dependence on
foreign personnel.
The slow growth of productive capitalist ven-
tures despite the availability of competent per-
sonnel and abundant investment funds may be
more adequately explained by the very profitable
opportunities for commerce which remain open.
As the 1975-80 Plan noted, "in a country growing
as rapidly as Nigeria, trading activities normally
represent the quickest means of increasing income,
whereas manufacturing projects usually have a
long gestation period" (Central Planning Office,
1975 : 152). Here the role of certain groups repre-
sented in the State must be considered. As a
market, the state itself absorbs large quantities
of imports. Decisions on expenditure, the award
of contracts and the granting of various dispen-
sations in the course of effecting these transac-
tions all involve officials in a national-foreign
commercial network. It has been noted that most
Nigerian businessmen perform an intermediary
or middleman role. Many State-foreign trans-
actions are mediated by middlemen, just as many
exchanges between final consumers and foreign
manufacturers are effected by the local com-
mercial bourgeoisie. To reduce imports is to re-
duce the business of this class. In practice, as
oil revenues have allowed for the expansion of
expenditure, the class of commercial middlemen
has itself grown. The nexus between state official,
local middleman and foreign salesman is intimate
and reciprocal and characterised by the inter-
change of roles among the indigenous personnel
of business and state officials. There is reason to
expect that these three sets of actors will try to
preserve the relations which allow for profitable
transactions.
A corollary of the fact that commerce offers
more attractive openings for profit than does in-
vestment in production is that individuals with
skills, experience and the drive to accumulate
money are naturally drawn into an intermediary
role. They are encouraged to take this route by
the growing number of foreign firms that seek
to penetrate the Nigerian market or secure a
larger share of that market. Those nationals most
likely to respond to overtures from foreign firms
are those with education and international ex-
perience. They are also the Nigerians most suited
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to undertake the organisation of capitalist pro
duction.
Commerce does not inevitably evolve into pro-
ductive activity and may positively discourage it.
Contrary to the expectations of many, the
Nigerian middleman who has accumulated sig-
nificant funds does not invest in production. He or
she is much more likely to extend the commercial
operation laterally so as to encompass the distri-
bution of more commodities and to extend it
'upstream' to absorb the marketing and distribu-
tion functions which are closer to the foreign
manufacturing operation itself. For instance, an
importe.r may add pre-frabricated housing units
to his import list of building materials. He may
extend into shipping in order to transport the
goods which hitherto ho purchased c.i.f. This
pattern of commercial extension may occur in
partnership with foreign firms such that the links
between Nigeria's commercial bourgeoisie and the
industrial bourgeoisie multiply and are intensi-
fied over time. Mergers and an interlocking pat-
tern of commercial interests enable us to identify
a Nigerian component of the international
bourgeoisie.
There is little documentation of this pattern of
development. Case studies of the growth of pri-
vate commercial firms in Nigeria have yet to be
made. They might test the 'incompatibility hy-
pothesis' presented here which explains the under-
development of production by the profitability of
international commerce and suggests that com-
merce rules out local capitalist production. An
assesment of the evolution of Nigerian commerce
would have to take into account the context pro-
vided by an inadequate infrastructure, the in-
volvement of the state in commerce, and the pre-
emption of certain productive opportunities by
foreign capital.
In conclusion, local manufacturing and the devel-
opment of intermediate and capital goods indus-
tries have long been a 'development objective' of
high priority for planners. Yet various attempts
by the State to promote structural changes in the
economy and take the initiative from foreign
capital have not been very successful. The strength
of commercial relations and reliance on foreign
management and technology supports the domi-
nance of the commericial and managerial frac-
tions of the bourgeoisie. Both the policies and
the capacity to evolve a more productive national
base for capital accumulation are weakened by
these social relations.
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